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Abstract 
This paper reviews the South African government procurement regime and asks whether adherence to 
international trading instruments and rules, and in particular the World Trade Organisation’s 
Government Procurement Agreement, would, and should, permit the maintenance of national policy 
criteria in the decision making matrix for procurement, whilst simultaneously enabling it to realise the 
efficiency gains of trade liberalisation. It also examines the likely impact, if any, that adherence to 
these rules would have in reducing the procurement system’s vulnerability to corruption. 
Keywords 
Government procurement; South Africa, WTO, GPA, corruption. 
 1 
Introduction 
South African government procurement is, as with many countries, used to advance selected economic 
and social policy objectives. However, also in common, with many countries, the overarching 
framework also stresses the requirement for fairness, equity and price competitiveness. A third 
common feature of government procurement practices is the ubiquity of maladministration and 
corruption. 
This paper asks whether adherence to international trading instruments and rules, and in particular 
to the World Trade Organisation’s Government Procurement Agreement, would, and should, permit 
the maintenance of national policy criteria in the decision making matrix for procurement, whilst 
simultaneously enabling it to realise the efficiency gains of trade liberalisation. It also examines the 
likely impact, if any, that adherence to these rules would reduce the procurement system’s 
vulnerability to corruption. 
The Regulatory Framework 
Prior to South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994, the procurement system in place was highly 
centralised. Partly in consequence of this centralisation, procuring goods and services favoured large 
corporate suppliers who dominated the market. Price was the overriding formal criterion for the 
procurement of goods and services by the government, although there is no doubt that public contracts 
were extensively deployed to support emerging Afrikaner-owned enterprises. However, on the face of 
it, price determined the outcome of public procurement bids, only overridden when there was clear 
evidence that the lowest bidder did not have the necessary experience or capacity to undertake the 
work or was financially unsustainable. That is, only if there was a high risk that the lowest bidder 
would not complete the contract – the ‘functionality’ criterion - was the tender awarded to another 
bidder. 
As the system of Apartheid was dismantled in the 1990s and as new fiscal visions were adopted, so 
too were the forms of fiscal management and administration recast. This vision placed redistribution at 
the heart of procurement necessitating decentralisation as a framework to support small and medium 
enterprise. This required a radical shift in the form and content of procurement which translated into 
an overhaul of the legislative and regulatory framework governing government procurement and its 
practical application. Core to this reformulation is the explicit reconceptualization of procurement as a 
policy tool, allowing government to use its massive spend on goods and services to achieve socio-
economic objectives. 
1
 
Procurement reforms that began in 1995 were directed at two broad focus areas, namely: 
 the promotion of principles of good governance 
 the introduction of a preference system to address certain socioeconomic objectives.  
These principles and objective are enshrined in Section 217 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa which reads: 
217 (1) When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or any 
other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, it must do so 
in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-
effective.  
(2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in that 
subsection from implementing a procurement policy providing for –  
(a) categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and  
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(b) the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination.  
(3) National legislation must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred to in 
subsection (2) may be implemented. 
To give effect to the new policy role of its procurement spend, government embarked upon the process 
of reforming the procurement system. This was initiated by the formulation of a ten-point plan which 
provided for interim procurement strategies until the enactment of national legislation consistent with 
the objectives of the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP), government’s overarching social 
and economic plan. 
The RDP committed government to the following procurement-related measures:  
 improved access to tendering information;  
 the development of tender advice centres; 
  the broadening of the supplier base for small contracts valued at less than R7500;  
 the waiving of security/sureties on construction contracts with a value less than R100 000; 
 the unbundling or unpacking of large projects into smaller projects;  
 the promotion of early payment cycles by government;  
  the development of a preference system for small, medium and micro-sized enterprises 
(SMMEs) which are owned by historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs); 
  the simplification of tender submission requirements;  
 the appointment of a procurement ombudsman; and  
 the classification of building and engineering contracts.
2
 
The first thrust of reform was thus born out of a desire to “include emerging small and medium 
enterprises effectively in government contracts.”3 These reforms sought to utilise procurement as a 
device to incorporate previously disadvantaged business owners in the mainstream economy as 
enacted in the Procurement Act of 2000. That is to say, the initial reform measures appeared to 
conflate inclusion of previously disadvantaged South Africans with measures to support the inclusion 
of SMEs. 
Ambe and Badenhorst-Weiss (2012, p. 245) note that these reforms were intended to modernise the 
management of the public sector, in essence to make it more “people-friendly” through the process of 
decentralisation and making the process more accessible to SMEs. This would not only allow 
government to diversify the supplier base, but it would also allow for more responsive procurement 
practices sensitive to the variable needs of local communities. However, the manner in which 
procurement was practically implemented and the ambitious policy imperatives that underpinned the 
initial formulation of post-apartheid procurement meant that procurement did not realise its objectives 
in relation to growing SMEs. Furthermore, lack of standardisation across different government 
structures led to a review of the system in the early 2000s. Two reviews, the Report on Opportunities 
for Reform of Government Procurement in South Africa
4
 and the World Bank’s Country Procurement 
Assessment Review of South Africa (World Bank, 2003), identified various deficiencies in the system 
and paved the way for the adoption of legislative and policy reforms that would enable more coherent 
decentralisation and thus allow public procurement to be used as a redistributive tool.  
A plethora of legislation was enacted between 1999 and 2003. This legislative framework is largely 
created by Section 217 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Section 112 of the 
                                                     
2
 Bolton (2006), pp. 204-5. 
3
 Public Affairs Research Institute (2004), p. 16. 
4
 AusAID and South Africa Capacity Building Program, (2000). 
Government Procurement, Preferences and International Trading Rules: the South African Case 
3 
Municipal Finance Management Act No. 56 of 2003 (MFMA), Section 76 (4) (C) of the Public 
Finance Management Act No. 1 of 1999 (PFMA), the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 
No. 5 of 2000 (PPPFA) and the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003. 
In accordance with Section 217(3) of the Constitution, the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act (PPPFA) No 5 of 2000 was enacted to provide the requisite framework for 
procurement. Section 9(2) of the Constitution also provides for the advancement of black economic 
empowerment (BEE) policies by organs of state as defined in Section 1 of the PPPFA
5
, which must be 
pursued within the confines of the framework provided for in the PPPFA. The PPPFA (and the 
attendant Public Procurement Regulations 2011) is to be read together with the Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act No 56 of 2003. These are the primary pieces of legislation that set the 
parameters for the use of public procurement to achieve socio-economic objectives.  
The Supply Chain Management (SCM) policy document, published in 2003, sought to address the 
lack of standardisation consequential upon a public procurement process which tasks organs of state in 
national, provincial or local government and other public institutions with drafting their own 
procurement policies, albeit guided by the national regulatory framework (Ambe and Badenhorst-
Weiss, 2012). The National Treasury Policy Strategy notes that  
“Supply Chain Management is an integral part of financial management that seeks to introduce 
internationally accepted best practice principles, whilst at the same time addressing government's 
preferential procurement policy objectives” (National Treasury, 2003).  
This document espoused the principle that managers should be given flexibility and discretion to give 
effect to the constitutional requirements of transparency and accountability. The policy involved the 
devolution of the SCM function to accounting officers at different tiers of government and aims to 
ensure “uniformity in bid and contract documentation, and options and bid and procedure standards” 
which would promote the standardisation of SCM practices (National Treasury, 2003, p. 6). These 
reforms entrenched the decentralisation of decision making in procurement, and gave supply chain 
managers the discretionary power to determine the form and practices of their SCM units and policies, 
within a basic requirement framework.  
Standardisation of decentralised decision making, combined with an emphasis on economic 
empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups, as articulated in broad based black economic 
empowerment and associated preferential procurement frameworks and policies, are thus essential to 
understanding procurement in South Africa. 
Preferential Procurement 
Black economic empowerment has become the critical socio-economic objective that public 
procurement seeks to promote. Before 2011, the PPPFA, read with the Public Procurement 
Regulations 2001, provided for the award of preference points for being a ‘historically disadvantaged 
individual’6, for subcontracting with a historically disadvantaged individual or for attaining certain 
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specific goals. Contracting authorities or organs of state had the discretion to determine precisely how 
to award the preference points by selecting the specific social policy objectives to accompany the 
mandatory promotion of historically disadvantaged ownership.
7
 These ‘specific goals’ included, inter 
alia, the promotion of South African enterprises, the promotion of enterprises in a specific region, 
municipality or rural area, the promotion of small, medium and micro enterprises, the creation of new 
jobs and the improvement of communities.
8
 This created a lot of uncertainty in the award of preference 
points and had to be done away with in favour of the 2011 Regulations and BBBEE Codes of Good 
Practice. 
Under the B-BBEE Act, there are various ways in which service providers can attain B-BBEE 
status level, and there is also an innovative option which allows multinational companies to attain B-
BBEE status level, in addition to these companies generally being able to acquire B-BBEE points 
through the various elements created in the Codes of Good Practice. This is in the form of ‘Equity 
Equivalent’ contributions that are made in lieu of a direct sale of equity but which count towards the 
overall B-BBEE ownership element.
9
 A multinational company may thus earn B-BBEE points without 
any black ownership of the company. Such equity equivalent programmes may take the form of 
enterprise creation programmes, programmes that promote social advancement, economic 
development programmes, projects aimed at technology diffusion/transfer within the small, medium 
and macro-enterprise sector of the local economy beyond the multinational’s core business activities, 
programmes that promote economic growth and employment through the development of 
technological innovation beyond the multinational’s core business activities, and initiatives that lead to 
sustainable job creation (Department of Trade and Industry, 2015). 
New B-BBEE Codes of Good Practice were published in the Government Gazette on 11 October 
2013 and came into effect on 11 October 2014. These codes reduce from 7 to 5 the number of the core 
elements to be considered for the scorecard from which an entity’s B-BBEE status is determined. 
These are: 
 Ownership 
 Management control 
 Skills development 
 New enterprise and supplier development 
 Socio-economic development.  
These policies are practically applied using a scoring formula. The Codes set out how each of the 
elements listed above is to be measured and weighted and translated into the overall status score. 
Ownership, skills development and supplier development are identified as ‘priority’ elements and 
firms have to attain a prescribed minimum weighting of the total for each element. 
However since price remains a critical criterion in the selection of contracts, the point system 
created by the Act is ‘dual-scale’ depending on the value of a specific contract. The total number of 
points that may be awarded to contractors is 100, and to ensure that organs of state still obtain 
competitively priced goods and services, more preference points are awarded for lower value 
contracts. This is evidence of the assumed interplay between the promotion of SMEs, on the one hand, 
and, on the other, the promotion of BEE as a means for diversifying the supplier base. For contracts 
with a Rand value between R30,000 and R1,000,000, the 80/20 preference system is used where a 
maximum of 80 points will be awarded for price and a maximum of 20 preference points will then be 
awarded for the B-BBEE status level of the bidder in accordance with the Preferential Procurement 
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Regulations 2011
10
 as well as the B-BBEE Act and its associated Codes of Good Practice. For 
contracts with a Rand value of over R1,000,000, the 90/10 point system applies, where a maximum of 
90 points will be awarded for price, while a maximum of 10 preference points must be awarded for the 
B-BBEE status level of bidders as set out in the 2011 Regulations.
11
  
The Preferential Procurement Regulations also provide for exemptions from B-BBEE status level 
for bidders with an annual total revenue of less than R10 million,
12
 who then qualify as Exempted 
Micro Enterprises (EMEs) in terms of the B-BBEE Act and must submit an affidavit stating their level 
of black ownership as well as their annual turnover.
13
  
Local production and content requirements apply to designated sectors where local production and 
content is determined to be critical for the award of the tender. Local content is defined as that 
proportion of the tender price which is not included in the imported content, provided that local 
manufacturing does take place within the borders of South Africa.
14
 Table 1 describes the designated 
sectors and the local production content requirements identified by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI, 2015). In these cases an organ of state must advertise the tender with a specific 
condition which provides that only locally manufactured goods with a stipulated minimum threshold 
for local production and content will be considered.
15
 If it is not a designated sector then the specific 
tendering condition on local production and content must be in accordance with the specific directives 
issued for this purpose by National Treasury, in consultation with the Department of Trade and 
Industry. 
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Table 1: Minimum local content thresholds by sector or product 
Industry/sector/sub-sector Minimum threshold for local content 
Buses (Bus Body) 80% 
Textile, Clothing, Leather and Footwear 100% 
Steel Power Pylons 100% 
Canned / Processed Vegetables 80% 
Pharmaceutical Products:   
 OSD Tender 
 Family Planning Tender 
 70% (volumes) 
 50% value 
Rail Rolling Stock 65% 
Set Top Boxes (STB) 30% 
Furniture Products:   
 Office Furniture 
 School Furniture 
 Base and Mattress 
 85% 
 100% 
 90% 
Solar Water Heater Components 70% 
Electrical and telecom cables 90% 
Valves products and actuators 70% 
Residential Electricity Meter :   
 Prepaid Electricity Meters 
 Post Paid Electricity Meters 
 SMART Meters 
 70% 
 70% 
 50% 
Working Vessels/Boats (All types): 60% 
 Components  10% - 100% 
Where two bidders score an equal total amount of points, then the tender must be awarded to the 
bidder with the most preference points for B-BBEE. Where functionality is part of the evaluation 
process, and two bidders score the same total amount of points, then the award must go to the bidder 
who scored the most points for functionality. Where two or more bidders score the same amount of 
points in all respects, then the tender must be decided by the drawing of lots.
16
 It further provides that 
a bidder must not be awarded BEE points if it is indicated in the tender documents that they intend to 
sub-contract more than 25% of the value of the contract to any other enterprise that does not qualify 
for at least the points that such a bidder qualifies for, unless such enterprise is an exempted micro 
enterprise.  
Additional provision is also made in the PPPFA for the award of a tender to a bidder who does not 
score the highest points but which meets other objective criteria, in addition to the specific goals
17
 set 
out in the Act, to justify such award. Section 2(1)(f) of the PPPFA provides that:  
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“… the contract must be awarded to the tenderer who scores the highest points, unless objective 
criteria in addition to those contemplated in paragraphs (d) and (e) justify the award to another 
tenderer.” 
The 2011 Preferential Procurement Regulations similarly allow for the award of a contract to a 
supplier who does not score the highest total number of points, but “only in accordance with section 
2(1)(f)” of the Act. A similar provision is contained in Regulation 9 of the 2001 Procurement 
Regulations which provide that  
 “a contract may, on reasonable and justifiable grounds, be awarded to a tender[er] that did not 
score the highest number of points”.  
National legislation is mirrored in procurement legislation for the third (municipal) tier of government. 
The Municipal Finance Management Act of 2003 (MFMA) and its Regulations provide a framework 
for the procurement of goods and services by a municipality or a municipal entity. Section 111 of the 
MFMA requires each municipality to implement a Supply Chain Management (SCM) Policy that 
gives effect to section 217 of the Constitution. The SCM Policy of a municipality or municipal entity 
must: 
 Describe in sufficient detail the supply chain management system that is to be implemented by 
the municipality or municipal entity; and 
 Must describe in sufficient detail effective systems for demand, acquisition, logistics, disposal, 
risk and performance management. 
Section 113 of the MFMA allows a municipality to consider an uninvited bid outside normal bidding 
processes; however, it may only do so within the prescribed rules. If a municipality approves a tender 
outside of regular processes, the accounting officer must notify the Auditor-General, the provincial 
treasury and the national treasury, outlining the reasons why it has deviated from the prescribed 
procedure. A municipal entity must also notify its parent municipality.  
The MFMA Regulations also require any SCM policy to provide measures to combat abuse and 
corruption in the supply chain management system. Amongst other measures, the supply chain 
management policy must enable the accounting officer to consult the Treasury’s database prior to 
awarding any contract to ensure that no bidder is prohibited from doing business with the public 
sector, as well as to enable the accounting officer to reject the bid of any bidders who have been listed 
on the Register for Tender Defaulters in terms of section 29 of the Prevention and Combating of 
Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
The MFMA requires the accounting officer of a municipality to implement the SCM Policy and to 
take all reasonable steps to ensure that proper mechanisms are in place to minimise the likelihood of 
fraud, corruption, favouritism and unfair and irregular practices. The Regulations further provide that a 
supply chain management policy of a municipality or municipal entity must state that the municipality 
or municipal entity may not make an award to a person who is in the service of the state.  
It is clear from the above that in terms of the preferential points awarded, B-BBEE remains the 
most critical factor. However, despite the social policy dimension afforded by the B-BBEE aspect, 
price still remains the most important consideration in awarding tenders and hence value for money 
and cost effectiveness is an important objective as well (Bolton and Quinot, 2011, p. 459).
18
 Given the 
complex nature of preferential procurement within this framework, and critical to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the public procurement system, are the mechanisms through which service providers can 
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seek redress in cases where they believe the procurement regulations have been violated by procuring 
entities or bidding parties.  
Enforcement and Dispute resolution mechanisms 
Government procurement is subject to the general rules of constitutional and administrative law in 
South Africa. While there is no specialist adjudicative body in South Africa that deals with 
procurement matters and reviews alleged non-compliance with legislation, the very act of a 
government entity awarding a contract constitutes administrative action and is therefore subject to the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) which provides recourse for aggrieved 
persons or parties prejudiced by maladministration. The Constitution provides for the challenge of 
tender awards or decisions on the grounds of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness. 
Since public procurement is regulated by both public law and private law, service providers therefore 
have recourse to both public law and private law remedies, including, in private law, delictual 
remedies in the event that there are damages. 
Public law remedies find application mainly in the pre-contractual stage, although they may, in 
exceptional circumstances, also apply in the contractual and post-contractual stages (Bolton, 
2008:781). It is important to note that the South African courts have been very active in clarifying 
legal issues on judicial remedies for persons or firms affected by procurement decisions. Some of 
these key findings include:
19
 
 The finding that decisions to invite, evaluate and award tenders amount to ‘administrative 
action’ and are therefore subject to judicial review. This was an important decision which 
stipulates the application of the PAJA in procurement decisions and hence enables the judicial 
review of procurement decisions, especially as the PAJA provides that judicial review only 
applies to state actions if such actions are ‘administrative actions’. It is also particularly 
noteworthy because not every act by an organ of state amounts to ‘administrative action’ under 
South African law.
20
 
The above is significant because the right to just administrative action is constitutionally 
protected. Section 33 of the South Africa Constitution provides for the right to just 
administrative action and provides: 
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair. 
(2)Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right 
to be given written reasons. 
(3)National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must — 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an 
independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); 
and 
(c) promote an efficient administration. 
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 Where specific case law is given in subsequent paragraphs, the paper draws from Volmink (no date).  
20
 Volmink (Ibid) notes that, the courts have held that a decision by an organ of state to dismiss an employee does not 
amount to administrative action (Transnet Ltd v Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd 2001 (2) BCLR 176 (SCA) at para 34). The 
courts have also held that a decision by a public body to cancel a contract that was concluded on equal terms with a major 
commercial undertaking does not constitute administrative action. (Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection 
Services (Western Cape) CC 2001 (3) SA 1013 (SCA)) The determining factors in deciding whether state action amounts 
to “administrative action” includes the source of the power exercised, the nature of the power, its subject matter, whether 
it involves the exercise of a public duty, and how closely it is related on the one hand to policy matters which are not 
administrative, and on the other to the implementation of legislation, which is construed as administratrive. (President of 
the RSA and Others v SARFU and Others 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) at para 142) 
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This right to just administrative action is given effect by the PAJA and the right to access to 
reasons is given effect by the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA). Section 33 of the 
Constitution should be read in tandem with Section 195 of the Constitution which deals with the 
values and principles that govern public administration.
21
 These constitutional provisions, read 
together with PAJA, are clearly aimed at preventing abuse of power by organs of state in their 
dealings with the public. They provide that just administrative action is necessary to protect the 
rights of the individual against organs of state, and that the state has a constitutional duty to 
achieve and uphold a fair, accountable, honest and responsive administration which is in the 
interests of the general public (Beukes, 2004). 
 South African courts have recognised that a losing bidder in a public procurement tender has had 
its rights affected by the decision and that such rights merit constitutional protection. While 
initially unwilling to recognise this right, the courts ultimately declared that the right of a bidder 
is not the right to be awarded the contract, but rather the right to access information that would 
enable the bidder to decide whether her right to fair administrative action has been infringed in 
the procurement process. The Supreme Court of Appeal has elaborated on this right as being the 
right to equal treatment before the law.
22
  
 The courts have also held that the right to be furnished with information relating to a tender 
decision cannot be waived even if the bidder has signed an agreement to that effect with the 
procuring body.
23
 
 The courts have also stated that the right to reasons requires that these be quality reasons and not 
simply standard form reasons where requirements are ticked off against a box. The reasons ought 
to be specific, detailed, in clear language that is neither ambiguous nor vague and is not framed 
in formal legal language
24
. 
 The courts have also been amenable to awarding punitive costs against the procuring state organ 
in instances where the state organ has unreasonably refused to furnish the requested 
information.
25
 
 The courts have also held that organs of state should not use the excuse of ‘state secrets’ in order 
to circumvent the obligation to provide information to affected bidders.
26
 
The PAJA provides that any person may institute proceedings in a court or tribunal for the judicial 
review of an administrative action and sets out the various instances where a court or tribunal may 
                                                     
21
 These are: 
 a) The promotion and maintenance of a high standard of professional ethics; 
 b) The promotion of efficient, economic and effective use of resources; 
 c) A development oriented public administration; 
 d) The provision of services impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias; 
 e) A responsiveness to people’s needs and the encouragement of the public to participate in policy making; 
 f) An accountable public administration; 
 g) The fostering of transparency by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information; 
 h) The cultivation of good human resource management and career development practices, to maximise human potential; 
 i) A public administration which is broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel 
management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve 
such broad representation. 
22
 SA Metal and Machinery Co (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd [1998] JOL 3984 (W). There are four reported judgments 
involving these parties. To avoid confusion, reference will be made to SA Metal Machinery Co Ltd v Transnet (1) to (4) 
respectively. 
23
 Goodman Brothers (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 1998 (8) BCLR 1024 (W) 
24
 Nomala v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare 2001 (8) BCLR 844 (E) 
25
 Claase v Information Officer of South African Airways (Pty) Ltd [2006] JOL 18804 (SCA 
26
 ABBM Printing and Publishing (Pty) Ltd v Transnet Ltd 1997 (10) BCLR 1429 (W) at paragraph 24.3 
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review an administrative action.
27
 Procedures for judicial review must be instituted without 
unreasonable delay and no later than 180 days after all internal remedies have been concluded or after 
the administrative action is concluded if the courts have, in exceptional circumstances, exempted the 
person from exhausting all internal remedies first.
28
 Otherwise no court shall review an administrative 
action until all the internal remedies have been exhausted.
29
 In terms of remedies for persons whose 
rights have been infringed by the administrative action, the PAJA states that the court or tribunal may:  
 direct the administrator to give reasons;  
 direct the administrator to act in a manner required by the court or tribunal;  
 prohibit the administrator from taking a particular action;  
 set aside the administrative decision or action;  
 direct the administrator to reconsider the action;  
 substitute or vary the administrative action;  
 direct the administrator to pay compensation;  
 declare the rights of the parties;  
 grant an interdict or other temporary relief;  
 award costs.
30
  
Bolton argues that the requirements for claiming compensation under the PAJA are controversial and 
unclear and essentially require an aggrieved bidder to prove the elements of delict in order to found a 
compensation claim (Bolton, 2008:781). In some instances, however, he notes that claiming costs 
under the PAJA may be the best route, as when contracts are terminated in the public interest or 
declared invalid because they were concluded without the necessary authority. The PAJA is thus a 
very useful tool to maintain the integrity of public procurement and ensure that the rights of the public 
and/or service providers are secure and protected.  
Private law remedies for aggrieved bidders are founded in contract law and also in the law of delict. 
These may include remedies aimed at upholding the contract which could include specific 
performance and an interdict, cancellation and remedies aimed at compensating the innocent party 
which could include contractual or delictual damages or interest on amounts owing (Christie and 
MacFarlane, 2006). Delictual remedies, as distinct from contractual remedies, could arise for various 
situations such as:  
“fraud on the part of public officials; misleading statements made by an organ of state during the 
tender process resulting in the conclusion of a more onerous contract than anticipated; the 
wrongful interference by a third party (an unsuccessful bidder) in the contractual relationship 
between the successful bidder and the organ of state.” (Bolton, 2008:781) 
Bolton further states cost-effectiveness is the overriding principle and such legislation as the Public 
Finance Management Act, Municipal Finance Management Act, and the Municipal Systems Act give 
effect to this by encouraging feuding parties to resolve disputes through negotiation and mediation, 
with litigation being pursued only as a last resort.  
However, as Magoro and Brynard (2010) note,  
“In practice these [procurement frameworks] are grossly oversimplified, and lead to difficulties 
and even corrupt practices during the implementation... These problems occur largely because the 
principles underlying the procurement system – fairness, equitableness, transparency, 
                                                     
27
 Section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3, 2000. 
28
 Section 7 (1) and & (2) (c) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3, 2000. 
29
 Section 2 (a) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3, 2000. 
30
 Section 8 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3, 2000. 
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competitiveness and cost-effectiveness – often are, or appear to be, in conflict with one another.”  
(p. 8) 
A high level assessment of South African Government Procurement Regime 
The depth and breadth of the post-1994 transformation in the procurement regime should not be 
underestimated. As already elaborated, underpinning this radical transformation was the determination 
to use government procurement as a key mechanism for redressing the inequities of South Africa’s 
past, in this particular instance racially defined access to business opportunities. Hence from a 
procurement system that, on the face of it, rested on price and, in practice, on exclusive, but otherwise 
undifferentiated, access by white-controlled businesses to government procurement, South Africa 
moved to a system based partly on price but also on a complex array of preferences largely directed at 
redressing unequal access, always undergirded by the constitutional requirements of fairness and 
administrative justice. 
A related, and conceivably more disruptive transformation, was the comprehensive 
decentralisation, or, more accurately described as the fragmentation, of procurement. There are a 
number of reasons for this fragmentation, which is present at both the regulatory and operational levels 
of the procurement system. One important rationale is the introduction of a quasi-federal system of 
government with significant powers newly devolved to the second (provincial) and third (municipal) 
tiers of government. Hence in 2004, the National Treasury made significant changes to the system by 
introducing a public sector SCM (supply chain management) legislative framework that provides for 
decentralised policy and public sector resource management. In line with the Public Finance 
Management Act (PFMA) and the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), the aim was to 
allow managers to manage (National Treasury, 2015:9). 
However, decentralisation is also related to the introduction of non-price criteria into the 
procurement decision because a procurement regime explicitly charged with facilitating the access of 
small, new entrants provides a further rationale for bringing the procurement decision as close as 
possible to the only terrain on which producers of this scale could successfully compete, namely 
provincial and local government.  
The disruption generated by decentralisation is experienced across a wide front. Legal or regulatory 
decentralisation introduces significant uncertainty and opacity into decision making. Operational 
decentralisation requires a massive replication of scarce procurement and supply chain management 
skills and renders the exercise of effective oversight significantly more onerous. Both regulatory and 
operational decentralisation provide enhanced opportunities and multiple sites for rent seeking. Each 
of these difficulties is compounded by the introduction of multiple and frequently conflicting decision-
making criteria. 
The data necessary to estimate the price premium, if any, arising from incorporating non-price 
considerations into the procurement decision and from sacrificing the scale economies of greater 
centralisation of procurement, are not available. However, the common sense conclusion that there is a 
premium to be paid arising both from fragmentation
31
 and the imposition of non-price decision-
making criteria, is widely supported.  
Balancing the price and non-price considerations in procurement decision-making is inherently 
complex: 
Finally, there is the challenge of finding the best balance between the two major objectives of 
procurement. Section 217(2) of the Constitution and the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework (PPPFA) both provide for the use of public procurement as a means of development 
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 ‘SCM across South Africa is highly fragmented. This makes it difficult for government to obtain maximum value when 
buying, and making use of, goods and services.’ (National Treasury, 2015:3). 
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and transformation. An effective SCM system must also have as an objective to ensure that goods 
and services are available at the best price, in the right qualities, at the right time and in the right 
place. Constantly having to make decisions about how to balance these objectives is demanding 
and difficult. It needs a cohort of SCM specialists with the right skills, experience, social 
awareness, ethical standards and dedication; and a regulatory and organisational environment that 
supports and monitors their work in the public interest.” (National Treasury, 2015:5). 
If hard evidence of the pricing consequences of a regime that is both highly fragmented and requires a 
balancing of non-price and price considerations is difficult to adduce, then there is little doubt about 
the extent of non-compliance with the complex array of regulatory requirements. The National 
Treasury Review confirmed findings of the Public Service Commission which puts overall compliance 
with SCM systems in certain departments at as low as 54% of all contracts issued (Public Service 
Commission, 2009:ix), with instances of non-compliance ranging over the entire SCM process, from 
the planning phase to the monitoring phase. The Treasury’s procurement review notes that  
Common findings in the Auditor General’s annual reports on SCM non-compliance include: 
 Appointment of suppliers who are not tax compliant  
 Failure to use competitive processes for quotations and bids  
 Incorrect use of the preference points system  
 Lack of appropriately qualified and skilled bid committees  
 Use of unqualified suppliers  
 Passing over of bids for invalid reasons  
 Use of incorrect procurement processes in relation to threshold values for quotations and 
competitive bidding  
 Extension of validity periods  
 Incorrect use of the limited bidding process  
 Inadequate controls and procedures for handling bids  
 Appointment of bid committee members not aligned with policy requirements  
 Insufficient motivation for deviations from SCM procedures. 
This is borne out by the experience of Corruption Watch, a non-governmental organisation that 
receives reports of corruption from the public, and which has, in the space of 3 years, received over 
700 reports of alleged irregularities and corruption in public procurement processes (Corruption 
Watch, 2015:9). The irregularities reported range over contracts awarded when the relevant bid 
committees have indicated a preference for an alternative supplier, inadequate advertisement of 
tenders, the alteration of submission dates, contracts rolled over without cause, the appointment of 
suppliers with scores below those of other bidders, and conflicts of interest between the members of 
the various bid committees, on the one hand, and bidders, on the other.  
Responsibility for rampant non-compliance is commonly ascribed to skills and capacity deficits in 
government, severely exacerbated by the high degree of operational fragmentation of the procurement 
system. However, with more than 80 different legal instruments that govern public sector SCM, it is 
probably the high degree of regulatory or legal fragmentation that bears primary responsibility for 
rendering an already skill-intensive function extremely difficult to operate. The Review lists the 
following as amongst the most serious problems arising from excessive regulatory fragmentation 
(National Treasury, 2015:11). 
 The high degree of uncertainty resulting from significant overlap and duplication among 
different regulatory instruments relating to infrastructure, construction, public-private 
partnerships and SCM policy standards; 
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 The uncertain legal status of the different regulatory instruments for general and specific 
procurement regimes such as the standards for defence procurement and ICT procurement; 
 The difficulty of deciding which legal regime applies, given the significant variation in the 
different legal instruments’ scope of coverage; and 
 The vast number of standard bidding documents. 
These systemic and structural features of the procurement regimes, compounded by, and themselves 
exacerbating, severe SCM skill deficits, undoubtedly account for much of the non-compliance that is a 
feature of government procurement. However they, in turn, contribute to, and are exacerbated by, a 
further set of related problems, namely the absence of consequence for non-compliance with the 
regulatory regime. The Review notes 
There are few, if any consequences for those who, despite support and encouragement, fail to 
perform at the required level. Repeated negative reports by the Auditor General highlights this 
lack of accountability. An improved and more dynamic public SCM system should bring out the 
best in its officials, and there must be consequences for those who are not willing to play their part 
for the public good. (National Treasury, 2015:5) 
The persistent failure to act upon negative findings of the Auditor General is itself partly a 
manifestation of the problems that resulted in much of the non-compliance in the first place, namely 
the absence of the skills required to manage the complex regulatory and operational environment. 
However non-compliance and the absence of consequences point to another ubiquitous and growing 
problem, namely corruption. In short, non-compliance with procurement regulation is not simply a 
consequence of complexity and human resource constraints; it is frequently the result of a wilful 
attempt to support outcomes that favour a pre-selected winner. 
Corruption – and particularly the bribery that characterises the grand corruption of government 
procurement – is, per definition, a clandestine conspiracy between a bidder, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, a public sector official capable of influencing the outcome of the bid. Thus whistle-blowers, 
except in those cases where they are direct participants in the corrupt conduct, rarely witness the 
exchange of the proverbial brown envelope.  
It is, however, significantly more difficult to hide the ‘irregularities’, the transgressions of the 
constitutional and other legislative and regulatory provisions that govern the procurement process, and 
that are generally a necessary feature of a corrupted public procurement process. As noted, these 
irregularities may take a multitude of forms spanning what may appear to be relatively minor 
bureaucratic transgressions (for example, permitting a slightly late submission), to more technically 
complex transgressions (for example, adjusting key bid specifications in the course of the decision-
making process) to transgressions that generate immediate suspicion, and that, for that very reason, are 
more carefully concealed (for example, conflicts of interest between, on the one hand, public officials 
serving on key bid decision-making structures, and, on the other, bidders). As already indicated, the 
South African government procurement regime regularly experiences the full range of these 
irregularities.  
A recent Constitutional Court judgement found an extremely large government tender awarded by 
the South African Social Security Agency to be illegal and invalid on the basis of a number of 
irregularities that were established in the course of hearings before a series of courts. In so doing, it 
overturned a judgement of a lower court – the Supreme Court of Appeal - that, although it broadly 
accepted that the tender had been irregularly awarded, nevertheless declined to invalidate the award 
reasoning that, in its view, even if the bid adjudicators had conscientiously adhered to the prescribed 
regulations, the result would not have changed. In short, the lower court held that the outcome was not 
materially affected by the irregularities in the process. In rejecting that argument, the Constitutional 
Court held 
‘deviations from fair process may themselves all too often be symptoms of corruption or 
malfeasance in the process. In other words, an unfair process may betoken a deliberately skewed 
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process. Hence insistence on compliance with process formalities has a three-fold purpose: (a) it 
ensures fairness to participants in the bid process; (b) it enhances the likelihood of efficiency and 
optimality in the outcome; and (c) it serves as a guardian against a process skewed by corrupt 
influences.’
32
 
In short, the Constitutional Court did not find corruption – it was not asked to do so. But it did find 
that there were clear irregularities in the awarding process. And it concluded that non-compliance was 
material, partly on the basis that  
‘…compliance with process formalities…serves as a guardian against a process skewed by corrupt 
influences.’ 
This decision of the Constitutional Court should lead to closer scrutiny by the criminal justice 
authorities of irregularly awarded government procurement contracts. Indeed having initially declined 
to investigate the basis of the irregularities found by a number of lower courts, following the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling the criminal justice authorities did announce that they were opening an 
investigation into the irregular, and hence inferentially corrupt, bid.  
However, notwithstanding this decision of the Constitutional Court, under-enforcement of the 
robust anti-corruption laws - largely a consequence of poorly resourced and trained enforcement 
personnel and highly corrupted policing and prosecutorial services – will remain the order of the day 
for the foreseeable future. 
Weak criminal enforcement serves to emphasise that critical to the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the public procurement system are the mechanisms through which service providers can themselves 
seek redress in cases where they believe the procurement regulations have been violated by procuring 
entities or bidding parties.  
South African Government Procurement: a multilateral framework? 
The Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is a legally binding agreement under the auspices of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO). It seeks to ‘achieve an effective multilateral framework for 
government procurement, with a view to achieving greater liberalisation and expansion of, and 
improving the framework for, the conduct of international trade’.33 This agreement, however, is a 
plurilateral agreement, that is, it only binds those WTO member countries that have signed up to it. 
The first four paragraphs of the preamble affirm the fundamental principles of non-discrimination, 
predictability and transparency. 
The GPA is thus an agreement that is intended, consistent with the WTO’s general purpose, to 
promote international trade, in this instance by liberalising the government procurement markets of 
member countries. This is bound to generate controversy, not least because government procurement 
is often thought to be the last redoubt of unfettered industrial policy, the one instrument left with 
which governments are able to pursue national social and economic objectives, relatively free from the 
policy constraints imposed by trade liberalisation.  
On the other hand, most government procurement frameworks explicitly affirm the central 
importance of price competitiveness in the procurement decision-making matrix, a factor which 
should give even the most ardent adherents of industrial policy pause for thought before rejecting 
liberalisation of the national government procurement market. Moreover, as is well-known, a 
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 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others v Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social 
Security Agency and Others. 
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 The Amended Government Procurement Agreement adopted on 30 March 2012 (GPA/113). For detail on the evolution 
of the GPA, see: WTO, ‘Agreement on Government Procurement’ 2012, Available at 
 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm  
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necessary adjunct to opening a market to international trade is adherence to governance rules that give 
effect to the new trade regime, rules that potentially constrain the corruption and maladministration 
that bedevil so many national procurement markets. 
The question posed in the title of this part will be examined from two angles. First, the trade and 
competitiveness implications of signing on to the GPA will be examined. It appears that it is these 
considerations that underpin the South African government’s resistance to the GPA despite the fact 
that severe data constraints render it impossible to examine this issue with any degree of rigour.  
Secondly, having already described and analysed the South African government procurement 
regime in some considerable detail, adherence to the GPA will be assessed by asking whether such 
adherence would indeed severely constrain the South African government's ability to utilise its 
procurement budget as an instrument of industrial policy and whether those rules will lend weight to 
efforts to combat maladministration and corruption in the country’s procurement regime.  
The GPA currently has 43 signatories and covers a market that is estimated at $1.6 trillion in 2008 
and $1.7 trillion when the Amended GPA entered into force in April 2014. The eventual accession of 
the countries currently negotiating accession to the GPA (including China, New Zealand, Montenegro, 
Albania, Georgia, Jordan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Oman, Tajikistan and Ukraine), and those 
negotiating accession as part of their WTO accession protocols (Macedonia, Mongolia, the Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia and Seychelles) could potentially increase the size of the liberalised 
government procurement market by between an estimated $440bn to $1.127 trillion (Niggli and Osei-
Lah, 2014). 
In terms of scope and coverage, the GPA agreement applies to: the procurement by entities covered 
under a Party's Annex 1, 2 or 3 to Appendix I of the GPA agreement;
34
 procurement whose value is 
above a specified threshold;
35
 and, defines procurement in terms of the agreement as meaning 
purchase, lease, and rental or hire purchase of goods and services or any combination thereof.  
South Africa and the GPA: the economic implications 
The primary consideration when weighing up possible accession to the GPA is centred on the potential 
national economic consequences of the liberalisation of an important market. These are, in turn, 
measured, firstly, by the impact of the enhanced access granted to foreign competitors to the 
government procurement markets of the nation acceding to the GPA and, secondly, by the reciprocal 
access granted by incumbent GPA members to their procurement market. Both effects defy easy 
measurement, effectively relying, as they do, on an assessment of the responsiveness of national 
producers to enhanced international competition. Successful penetration on the part of national 
producers to hitherto closed national procurement markets elsewhere in the world is not guaranteed by 
greater formal access, just as easing formal access to one’s own national government procurement 
market does not guarantee the ability of international producers to successfully penetrate that market. 
The price effects of enhanced competition in the domestic procurement are, trite to say, particularly 
difficult to estimate. 
Niggli and Osei-Lah (2014) propose the following steps in determining a country’s GPA market 
access potential, that is, its ‘offensive’ interests:  
 Identify the GPA Parties which provide coverage in the sectors of interest to it and assess the 
scope and extent of the said commitments;  
 Quantify the estimated size or value of market access that has been opened up by these parties; 
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 The Annexes to Appendix 1 identify the specific government and sub-government entities that each signatory has 
committed to GPA obligations, and thus opened to international competition, as specified by that signatory.  
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 This refers to the minimum threshold values above which the GPA agreement applies. 
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 Determine the competitive strength of its domestic firms to effectively compete in these markets; 
and, 
 Assess the proximity advantage of regional markets, were several countries in the region to be 
Party to the GPA. 
The sectors that provide the clearest basis for South Africa’s offensive interests in the GPA are in 
construction and civil engineering, including the development of large scale mining projects, as well 
as in medium technology industrial machinery and transport equipment. Specifics include the repair, 
maintenance and upgrading of various kinds of oil and gas marine vessels; the design, fabrication and 
construction of specialised modules or facilities for the oil industry, including storage tanks, 
processing modules for offshore platform or onshore facilities, docking facilities, tugs/barges, civil 
structures, platforms. South Africa is a global leader in coal-based synthesis and gas-to-liquids 
technologies; globally competitive in the production of transport and haulage equipment as well as in 
the mining equipment sector, to mention but a few. That South Africa is competing in medium and 
high technology sectors also creates the potential for further upgrading in the value chain.  
Significant lacunae in government procurement data render the determination of defensive interests 
extremely difficult. Indeed, given the poor state of procurement data, one can only conclude that South 
African government opposition to liberalising these markets is based on little more than guess work 
and a pre-determined opposition to trade liberalisation per se. Were serious consideration to be given 
to GPA accession, policy attention would, as a necessary prior step, have to be accorded to the 
generation of the data necessary to make an intelligent decision. For a government intent on utilising 
industrial policy in order to meet key economic and social objectives, it is clear that one of the most 
important instruments of this policy – namely, government procurement – is being deployed without 
the requisite empirical basis.  
Nor, it appears, do South African trade officials; take much comfort from the fact that, by signing 
up to the GPA, they do not commit to liberalising access to the entire government procurement 
market. Their assessment of power imbalances in the WTO’s negotiating framework underpin a fear 
that the inevitable outcome of negotiated accession will be to concede significantly greater access to 
the domestic procurement market than is in South Africa’s mercantilist interest. 
South Africa and the GPA: policy sovereignty 
As already elaborated, government procurement as an instrument of industrial policy, is deployed not 
merely in order to prefer national over non-national producers, but principally to promote the interests 
of selected classes of national producers over all others.  
However the GPA is founded on the principles of transparency and non-discrimination and its 
objective is to extend these principles to the signatories’ public procurement markets (Alvarez-
Fernáand and Brandstrup, no date). On the face of it then, preferences within the South African 
government procurement regime would appear to be fundamentally at odds with the principles 
underpinning the GPA. And yet, in practice, this does not appear to be the case. 
Even though the revised GPA is not a drastic departure from the earlier texts, particularly with 
reference to the fundamental principles of non-discrimination and transparency, it has been 
significantly simplified and permits greater flexibility for developing country members, designed 
particularly to make accession to the Agreement easier. South Africa, however, is particularly wary of 
plurilateral agreements in general, and its default stance has been to exclude any discussion on new 
plurilateral agreements being introduced to the WTO and certainly to steer clear of existing plurilateral 
agreements to which the country is not party.  
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Generally, the governance principles underpinning the GPA are the same as those underpinning 
government procurement regulation in South Africa, especially regarding considerations of fairness, 
equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost effectiveness.  
However, the non-discrimination principle underpinning the GPA may conflict with the social and 
economic objectives that underpin the South African procurement regime. As already elaborated, 
whilst espousing what are essentially principles of non-discrimination in relation to government 
procurement, the South African Constitution also explicitly provides for the introduction of 
preferences in the administration of government procurement, preferences which are elaborated in 
subordinate legislation and regulation. Thus, despite broadly identical high-level principles, the reality 
of the South African government procurement regime may conflict with unyielding enforcement of the 
GPA principles. 
Of course, jealously guarding national control over government procurement decisions in the name 
of advancing key social and economic objectives, begs the question of whether the stated objectives 
are actually being advanced by the deployment of the procurement instrument. Once again hard 
evidence is strikingly difficult to adduce. However the National Treasury review of the supply chain 
mechanism is sceptical of the impact of procurement preferences on the building of sustainable SMEs 
(National Treasury, 2015:32).  
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence supporting government procurement’s stated goal of 
promoting sustainable SMEs and new entrants, South African accession to the GPA will undoubtedly 
remain conditional upon being able to retain these and other industrial and social policy objectives in 
its procurement regime. Given that the GPA provisions for special and differential treatment are 
temporary (through implementation periods) and transitional (through negotiation), South African 
policymakers will certainly view GPA accession as a potential barrier to SME growth and 
development, undoubtedly reinforced by the prevailing assessment of its trade officials that holds that 
power dynamics in the WTO will eventually eliminate its ability to hold its line on the preferential 
treatment in the procurement regime of selected classes of producers. 
A brief survey of South Africa’s key bilateral and regional trade agreements is testimony to South 
Africa’s generalised opposition to any externally imposed disciplines on government procurement. 
The European Community-South Africa Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation (TDCA) 
of 1999 only provides, as far as government procurement is concerned, that the parties, ‘agree to 
cooperate to ensure that access to the Parties’ procurement contracts is governed by a system which is 
fair, equitable and transparent’.36 The Southern African Development Community (SADC)-European 
Union (EU) Economic Partnership Agreement whose negotiation was concluded on 15 July 2014, and 
was, for South Africa, essentially a renegotiation of the TDCA, also does not include a chapter on 
government procurement. It appears that negotiations leading to the South Africa – European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) Free Trade Agreement of 2006 traversed the implications of the black 
economic empowerment policy for public procurement. However the text that was ultimately agreed 
simply emphasises that the countries recognise the importance of cooperation to enhance the mutual 
understanding of their respective government procurement systems.
37
 
Continental trade agreements also confirm this pattern. The Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) Agreement does not contain any provisions relating to government procurement and neither 
does the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Trade Protocol. South Africa is also 
currently involved with the negotiations towards the Tri-partite Free Trade Area (TFTA), a 
preferential trade area that combines SADC, the East African Community (EAC) and the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Again, government procurement is a non-issue 
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in these negotiations, a reflection of South Africa and other African countries’ desire to maintain 
national policy sovereignty in that area or possibly a reflection of the level of importance accorded 
such issues by the relevant countries.  
In short, there does not appear to be much support for a multi-country initiative to address issues of 
government procurement in Africa. Within the TFTA, it is only COMESA that has adopted a regional 
framework on government procurement. COMESA’s Regional Procurement Regulations were adopted 
in 2012, designed to address the weak, inefficient and uncompetitive government procurement systems 
in member states.  
Other regional configurations would probably benefit from a regional approach to public 
procurement. This would likely boost intra-regional trade and enable African producers to take 
advantage of investment and infrastructure development opportunities in Africa. This is particularly so 
within the context of the TFTA to which South Africa is party and where infrastructure development is 
one of the priority areas. Procurement regimes will play a central role in whether or not South African 
producers get a share of the market to provide the various goods and service needed to realise the 
infrastructure development ambitions of the TFTA. 
Non-discrimination and Transparency 
Article IV:1 of the GPA deals with the general principles on non-discrimination and provides for both 
the most favoured nation as well as the national treatment principle. The South African government 
procurement regime provides for award criteria that are more concerned with supplier characteristics 
than with the national origin of the procured goods and services procured being of South African 
origin. The conditions of competition for both local and foreign firms are, with limited exception, 
identical in relation to government procurement criteria. The competing firms are simply required to 
satisfy the legislated award criteria (Bolton and Quinot, 2011:459). Domestic firms that do not meet the 
procurement award criteria will be just as disadvantaged as the foreign firms that also fail to meet the 
criteria. The same conditions and criteria that apply to domestic suppliers with regard to black 
economic empowerment also apply to foreign suppliers.  
Nevertheless, the South African government procurement regime’s emphasis on broad-based black 
economic empowerment effectively puts the South African subsidiaries of foreign owned firms at a 
decided disadvantage. In recognition of this, the new preferential procurement regulations allow for 
differentiated contributions to BBBEE for local and foreign owned firms through the use of offsets. In 
this regard, the Equity Equivalent Programme for multinational companies, referred to above, 
becomes significant as it does away with the black ownership requirement for BBBEE status. This 
approach therefore creates scope for foreign suppliers to compete with local suppliers in the 
government procurement market.  
The use of offsets is expressly prohibited in the Article IV: 6 of the GPA which precludes parties 
from seeking, taking account of, imposing or enforcing any offsets. At the same time, Article V on 
special and differential treatment provides for the use of offsets by developing countries on condition 
that such requirement is expressly stated in the notice of intended procurement. But, this provision is 
limited in that it is temporary and the transition period would still need to be negotiated with other 
parties.  
Under the non-discrimination principle in the GPA, parties must also not discriminate against the 
producers of other GPA members for protectionist reasons. However, South Africa does utilise public 
procurement for the purposes of promoting industrialisation and the Department of Trade and 
Industry, through its Industrial Policy Action Plan, seeks to support selected sectors in manufacturing. 
As such, local production and content requirements apply to designated sectors. Again, while this 
approach is, in principle, prohibited under the GPA, Article V recognises that developing countries 
have different developmental, financial and trade needs and allows for special and differential 
treatment of developing countries.  
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The non-discrimination provisions of the GPA are supported by the transparency provisions of 
Article IV: 4. This article provides that procuring entities must avoid conflicts of interest and prevent 
corrupt conduct in their procurement practices. This would speak directly to some of the governance 
challenges, elaborated above, that South Africa faces in its procurement system.  
The GPA would, therefore, provide a potential external constraint on corruption and also facilitate 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness in government procurement in South Africa. This can be achieved 
through the transparency and disclosure requirements in Articles XVI through to XVII. Article XVI, in 
particular, would oblige the government to establish a one-stop portal on procurement information. 
This would partly address the decentralization problem in procurement. At the same time, it would 
also limit the discretion of supply chain managers by holding them accountable to publicly available 
requirements regarding procurement specifications, processes and award criteria.  
Because the GPA requires adherence to principles and practices of transparency, efficiency, 
procedural fairness and good governance, accession on the part of South Africa may act to constrain 
contrary conduct which, as outlined above, increasingly characterises the government procurement 
regime. On the other hand, it may be credibly argued that these principles are already enshrined in 
South African law and that taking on what are effectively identical obligations in the GPA would add 
little to the domestic provisions already in place. Moreover, the National Treasury review has 
indicated that it intends making public information pertaining to the demand, acquisition and contract 
management phases of the procurement process. 
Review and Enforcement 
The GPA mandates each Party to establish or designate at least one impartial administrative or judicial 
authority that is independent of its procuring entities to adjudicate the review of procurement cases.  
South Africa does not have a review and enforcement mechanism that is dedicated to government 
procurement issues. As such, determining the effectiveness of the domestic review process, requires a 
judgement of the South African judicial system. While the independence of the South African high 
courts is generally accepted, the same cannot be said of the National Prosecuting Authority. The 
upshot is that while judicial reviews – usually initiated by losing bidders – of administrative processes 
governing the award of public procurement contracts can be relied upon to uphold the principles 
enshrined in both domestic law, the likelihood of criminal investigation and prosecution of allegedly 
corrupted public procurement awards is relatively remote. 
Successful judicial review may result in the setting aside of government procurement contracts. 
However, the inordinate length of judicial proceedings, frequently means that by the time that the final 
appeal court has made its decision, the disputed contract has run its course, or it is at such an advanced 
stage that termination would result in significant prejudice to the beneficiaries. This conundrum is 
clearly illustrated in the All Pay matter referred to above. At issue was the award of the tender to 
manage South Africa’s massive social security programme. In this instance the Constitutional Court, 
in setting aside the severely flawed tender award, was compelled to craft a remedy that nevertheless 
enabled the winner of the award to continue servicing the contract so as to ensure that the continued 
functioning of a complex system was not jeopardised. Given that the decision of the final court was 
only handed down in the third year of a five year grant, the outcome effectively permitted the 
incumbent to complete the contract. One can readily assume that the courts may be similarly 
constrained when confronted by a half-built dam or football stadium. 
The only advantage of the GPA in terms of the domestic review procedures is that it provides the 
option for Parties to utilise the WTO dispute settlement mechanism where South Africa’s laws, 
regulations and practices contravene GPA principles. This avenue is not directly open to private 
foreign bidders but they can lobby their governments to intervene.  
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Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries 
For developing countries, implementation constraints as well as perceived and actual limitations 
imposed on policy sovereignty, dominate discussion and decision-making surrounding adherence to 
WTO instruments.  
Article V of the GPA, which deals with both the implementation and market access derogations for 
developing countries, would be considered especially critical by South Africa were it to consider 
accession to the GPA. Article V provides that in the accession negotiations, the GPA members shall 
give special consideration to the developmental, financial and trade needs and circumstances of 
developing countries and least developed countries (LDCs). This is the special and differential 
treatment (S&DT) element of the GPA. S&DT is one of the basic tenets of the WTO that seeks to 
level the playing field for both developed and developing countries by relaxing the rules and 
commitments applied to the latter category of countries.  
Through S&DT, developing countries are provided with longer implementation periods for their 
commitments under the GPA, with the exception of the obligations contained in Article IV:1(b) on 
non-discrimination of goods, services or suppliers of any other party. LDCs are given 5 years in which 
to achieve implementation, while other developing countries are given 3 years.
38
 These 
implementation periods may be extended upon request to the GPA Committee or the Committee may 
approve new transitional measures if there are special circumstances that were unforeseen during the 
accession process.
39
 Upon a developing country’s accession to the GPA, each party is obliged to 
accord it the most favourable coverage afforded to any other party in the Agreement.
40
  
Article V also makes provision for transitional measures for developing countries which cater to 
both the defensive and offensive interests of developing countries (Niggli and Osei-Lah, 2014). The 
defensive tools, which give developing countries flexibility as they transition into the open market, 
include price preference programmes, the phased-in addition of specific entities or sectors, and the 
ability to impose thresholds that are higher than the permanent levels.
41
  
With regard to offensive interests, Article V:3 (b) provides for the use of offsets
42
 which, in the 
case of South Africa, would help promote local industry as per the objectives of the Industrial Policy 
Action Plan. Both the defensive and offensive measures provided for by Article V are designed to give 
developing countries a temporary reprieve from foreign competition as they transition into the 
agreement. It must be noted, however, that unlike the longer implementation periods specified for any 
obligations assumed under the agreement, the market related transitionary measures have to be 
established through negotiation.  
There has been increasing discontent among developing countries with the traditional S&DT 
provisions in WTO agreements. Most of these provisions are deemed ineffective, especially with 
regard to the capacity building and technical assistance provisions. The provision in the GPA on the 
review of Article V provides a unique opportunity for developing countries to strengthen the S&DT 
provisions. This is especially as there is also a provision for the Committee to review Article V in 
terms of its operation and effectiveness every five years. In the Trade Facilitation Agreement, agreed 
to at the December 2013 Bali Ministerial Conference, the implementation of some commitments is 
contingent on countries receiving capacity building and technical assistance. Where developing 
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 Article V: 4 of the GPA. 
39
 Article V: 6 of the GPA. 
40
 Article V: 2 of the GPA. 
41
 Article V: 3 (a), (c) and (d), read with Niggli and Osei-Lah (2014). 
42
 ‘Offset means any condition or undertaking that encourages local development or improves a Party's balance-of-
payments accounts, such as the use of domestic content, the licensing of technology, investment, counter-trade and 
similar action or requirement.’(Article 1 (l) GPA). 
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countries have not received the requisite assistance, they shall not be expected to implement the 
commitments.  
Rather than a blanket transition period for developing and least developed countries, the TFA 
provides for a staggered implementation process that is based on each individual developing country’s 
national trade facilitation needs assessment. This needs assessment is then used to determine the 
country’s capacity and, concomitant to that, the level of assistance needed to implement its 
commitments under the TFA. Of course, trade facilitation cannot be equated with government 
procurement in terms of implementation assistance but the same principle with regard to transition 
periods and a staggered implementation process could be adopted.  
Some programmes, such as the black economic empowerment programme, if South Africa were to 
sign up to the GPA, could be left open-ended. This is especially considering the unique circumstances 
that have created a dual economy in South Africa where the majority of the population was excluded 
from active participation in the formal economy. Such empowerment policies are needed to effect 
redress. The major problems with black economic empowerment policies in South Africa are less to 
do with the policy itself but rather the implementation of the policy. 
The use of procurement policies for socio-economic objectives itself remains contested but South 
Africa seems to have made significant strides in opening up competition in the procurement sector. 
There appears to be room for South Africa’s procurement regime to escape discrimination censure 
under the GPA as well as for negotiation of the BBBEE programme as a derogation and exemption.  
As elaborated above, there are general challenges to obtaining data on government procurement in 
South Africa. There is no mechanism in place for data collation, both aggregated and disaggregated, 
beyond information on how much National Treasury allocates to government procurement in each 
year. This creates a wastage of resources and inefficiencies in the system as well as massive loopholes 
for corrupt practices in government procurement. There is also lack of data on the total general 
government procurement; on the number of tender awards and the disaggregation between BEE 
beneficiaries and non-BEE beneficiaries; or, even, on the efficacy of the BEE policy itself in 
government procurement to achieve its objectives.  
The National Treasury’s Supply Chain Management Review seeks to remedy this and a host of 
other issues through such measures as a centralised automated government procurement database. A 
framework is also being put in place to standardise reporting on government contracts and information 
required will include: procurement plans; tenders to be advertised; tenders awarded; supplier company 
information; the value of each award; and, progress in implementing tenders. The information will be 
made public at varying intervals depending on its nature.  
In order to combat the ubiquitous interest conflicts that beset the award of governments contracts, 
the recently passed (but not yet promulgated) Public Administration Management Act prohibits public 
servants from doing business with the state. Such reform is in line with the provisions of Article VI 
and VII which detail the procedural requirements GPA members have to implement to ensure 
transparency in the sector. The NGO, Corruption Watch, the local chapter of Transparency 
International, is participating actively in the latter’s global campaign for national public registers of 
beneficial owners. The campaign is, in the first instance, proposing that eligibility for a government 
procurement contract be conditional upon a prospective bidder being willing to declare, for the public 
record, the identity of the beneficial owners of its shareholding companies and trusts. This proposal 
would not only make a significant contribution to detecting money laundering – the principal target of 
the campaign – but it would also expose, or, better, deter, the interest conflicts present in so many 
government procurement deals. 
From a governance perspective, although the South African procurement regime appears consistent 
with the requirement of GPA membership, there is little doubt that an additional layer of 
Memory Dube, Liezemarie Johannes and David Lewis 
22 
accountability would assist in promoting procurement that is ‘fair, equitable, transparent, competitive 
and cost effective’. 
However, this consideration will not feature significantly in a decision to accede to the GPA. Of 
much greater importance will be an assessment, firstly, of the impact on South Africa’s ability to 
retain national sovereignty over the procurement decision making framework and so retain the 
presence of socio-economic criteria in the purchasing decision. And, secondly, an assessment of the 
extent to which South Africa is able to win a bargain in which it would aspire to access to the 
procurement markets of other countries while defending those parts of the domestic procurement 
markets in which South African producers will be particularly exposed to foreign competition. 
Notionally at least, South Africa should be able to hold the line on these objectives. However, it 
appears that fear of the power dynamics in the WTO negotiating processes – whether well advised or 
not – seems destined to keep South Africa out of the GPA for the foreseeable future.  
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